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Editors' Summary 
THE  BROOKINGS PANEL on Economic Activity held its sixtieth confer- 
ence in Washington,  D.C.,  on September  7 and 8, 1995. This issue of 
Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity includes  the articles and dis- 
cussions presented  at that conference. The first article uses plant-level 
data  on both expenditures  and  retirements  to show how microeconomic 
investment  decisions lead to aggregate  investment  dynamics. The sec- 
ond reviews the changes in regulation,  technology, and applied  finance 
that underlie  the recent transformation  of U.S. commercial  banking  in 
order  to forecast the industry's future under  nationwide  banking. The 
third  looks for the common  elements in the recent  collapse of the Mex- 
ican peso and several other currency  crises of the last twenty years. 
The fourth investigates the link between stock price movements and 
real economic activity, in particular,  examining whether  stock values 
have a causative effect.  And the fifth article examines the existing 
evidence on the relationship  between the size of government  and eco- 
nomic performance, in light of the great increase in government  in- 
volvement in the industrialized  economies since World  War  II. 
IN  SPITE  OF decades of research, aggregate  investment  equations  are 
far from satisfactory. Few economists have much confidence in the 
estimates  of the effects of changes in the cost of capital  on investment, 
or in estimates of the dynamics of the adjustment  of the capital stock 
to macroeconomic  shocks. In recent years, various  attempts  have been 
made to gain insight into aggregate investment  by examining firm or 
industry  behavior. Several features  of the microeconomic  data seem to 
be at variance with the dynamics of adjustment  of the capital stock 
assumed  in the standard  neoclassical model. Rather  than  the partial  and 
smoothed adjustment  implied, for example, by quadratic  costs of ad- 
justment, investment at the plant level appears  to be lumpy and the 
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probability  of an investment  spike increases  with the time elapsed since 
the previous spike. These features  lend support  to the view that at the 
microeconomic  level the adjustment  technology is nonconvex, reflect- 
ing, for example, fixed set-up costs for undertaking  an investment  proj- 
ect.  However, aggregation is  likely to smooth such behavior. It is 
therefore  an empirical question whether  explicit aggregation  of equa- 
tions estimated at a highly disaggregated level will provide a better 
explanation  of aggregate investment. Recent research  using SIC two- 
digit postwar U.S.  manufacturing  data suggests that it may be. For 
example, allowing for time-varying  elasticity of aggregate  investment 
helps to explain the high skewness and kurtosis of the time series of 
aggregate  investment. 
In the first article of this issue Ricardo Caballero, Eduardo  Engel, 
and  John  Haltiwanger  make  an innovative  attempt  to use plant  data  both 
to improve  our understanding  of investment  behavior  at the microeco- 
nomic level and  to develop an aggregate  investment  equation  that  makes 
explicit use of the distribution  of firms  with respect  to the determinants 
of investment. The authors  focus on equipment  investment, utilizing 
data from a sample of seven thousand  continuously  operating  plants  in 
the U.S.  manufacturing  sector for the period 1972-88.  This is an im- 
posing body of data to analyze. To organize it they use a relatively 
simple framework  that allows separate  analysis of the desired capital 
stock and of the investment  that adjusts  the actual  to the desired stock. 
Each plant's investment  is assumed  to depend  on the authors'  estimate 
of "mandated" investment, the deviation between the desired and ac- 
tual capital stock. The estimates of mandated  investment  by plants are 
used to estimate a common adjustment  rate function which specifies, 
for each value, the fraction  of mandated  investment  that is to be elim- 
inated by actual investment  in one period. The large number  of obser- 
vations allows this to be done without  restricting  the function's shape. 
In particular,  the authors  group plants by the value of mandated  in- 
vestment  and, for each group, simply calculate  the fraction  of mandated 
investment  that is, on average, actually undertaken.  They then use the 
adjustment  function to calculate aggregate  investment  for a variety of 
distributions  of mandated  investment. 
The first step in filling out this framework  is to estimate, for each 
plant and time period, the desired and actual equipment  stocks, and 
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stock by a perpetual  inventory  method utilizing plant-level retirement 
information  and depreciation  rates from the appropriate  two-digit in- 
dustry. The desired capital stock at any time is assumed  to depend  on 
the plant's current output and the cost of capital. The elasticity of 
desired  capital  with respect  to output  is inferred  from capital's share  of 
costs. However, unlike many  earlier  investment  equations, the elastic- 
ity with respect to the cost of capital is separately  estimated, but with 
the restriction  that the elasticity is the same across all plants  in a given 
two-digit sector. The desired capital stock is also allowed to differ 
across plants by a plant-specific  constant. 
At the aggregate  level the sensitivity of equipment  investment  to the 
cost of capital is of great interest. It is one of the major  channels by 
which monetary  or tax policy may affect the rate of capital formation. 
In the authors'  framework,  changes in the cost of capital affect invest- 
ment by changing the desired capital stock and creating  a discrepancy 
between actual and desired holdings. The cost of capital series is con- 
structed  using industry-specific  price deflators,  depreciation  rates, and 
tax credits,  together with an economywide  corporate tax rate and 
an assumed constant real interest rate. These series show substantial 
variation  over time and across industries. The authors  show that the 
changes  over time in the cost of capital  reveal the effect of tax changes, 
with a large  favorable  shock in the early 1980s and  a substantial  adverse 
shock following the tax reform  of 1986. These aggregate  variations  in 
the cost of capital  are  of the same magnitude  as aggregate  "profitability 
shocks" reflecting  common shocks to the ratio of output  to capital. At 
the plant-specific level,  the relative variation  in profitability  is much 
greater, no doubt reflecting, in part, the fact that the cost of capital is 
taken  to be the same for all plants  in a given industry.  Estimates  of the 
elasticity of desired capital with respect to its cost vary widely across 
industries,  from  a low near  zero to a high near  minus  two. The estimates 
average approximately  minus one, the long-run  elasticity implied by 
the standard  Cobb-Douglas  assumption. 
Given estimates of the output  and the cost of capital  elasticities and 
the plant-specific  factor, it is straightforward  to compute a time series 
of mandated  investment  and the combined  effect of the cost of capital 
and profitability  shocks on desired capital for each plant. The distri- 
butions of these variables, and of equipment  investment  across plants 
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aggregate  investment.  Pooling all of the observations,  shocks  to desired 
capital  look roughly  normal.  However, the distribution  of actual  equip- 
ment investment  relative to capital is heavily skewed in the positive 
direction  and  displays high kurtosis.  These two facts taken  together  are 
a clear suggestion of the presence of nonconvexities  and asymmetries 
in the adjustment  technology. The concentration  of mass is consistent 
with the view that, in a given time period, many firms  are not heavily 
engaged in either the sale or acquisition  of equipment;  the fat positive 
tail of the distribution  is consistent with adjustments,  when they are 
made, being large. In contrast  with the distribution  of investment,  the 
pooled distribution of  mandated investment, while not noticeably 
skewed, is less peaked  than  the normal  distribution.  Such a distribution 
would result if firms were inactive when they were near their desired 
capital stock, rather  than always adjusting  part-way  toward  that level. 
In addition  to the pooled distributions,  the authors  calculate  the kurtosis 
of the distributions  period by period. In part because of shifts in the 
means  of the distributions  over time, the pooled distributions  show less 
kurtosis  than the average  of corresponding  temporal  distributions,  but 
otherwise  give a very similar  picture. 
The significant  departures  from normality  in the distributions  of in- 
vestment  and  mandated  investment  call into question  the standard  quad- 
ratic cost of adjustment  model. In the quadratic  case, investment-to- 
capital ratios and mandated  investments  are both linear combinations 
of previous shocks; since shocks appear  roughly normal, these distri- 
butions should themselves both be normally  distributed.  The shape of 
the adjustment  function  provides  more  direct  evidence on the nature  of 
adjustment  costs. The commonly  assumed  quadratic  costs of adjustment 
imply partial adjustment  at a constant rate; the fraction of the gap 
between desired and actual capital that is closed in any one period is 
independent  of the level of that gap. By averaging  the adjustment  rate 
for firms falling into narrow intervals of  mandated  investment, the 
authors  create an estimate of the entire adjustment  function and find 
that it is not consistent with the quadratic cost-partial adjustment 
model. They find that when mandated  investment  is negative because 
plants have excess equipment, the function is flat at a low rate. For 
positive levels of mandated  investment  the adjustment  function is pos- 
itively sloped, with the rate  of adjustment  for high values of mandated 
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expected if adjustment  costs are nonconvex and investment  is difficult 
to reverse. 
While the estimated adjustment  function indicates that investment 
increases more than proportionally  with mandated  investment, there is 
substantial  variation  in investment  across plants for any level of man- 
dated  investment.  The authors  display histograms  of the investment-to- 
capital  ratio  for plants  with high and  low levels of mandated  investment. 
At high levels most plants invest, and many invest at rates of over 50 
percent  of their capital stocks. At low levels of mandated  investment, 
on the other hand, a large number  of firms  do not invest at all; indeed, 
the distribution  is very similar to that of firms with negative levels of 
mandated  investment. 
The authors  also estimate an adjustment  equation  parametrically  in 
the form of a fourth-order  polynomial plus a sector-specific constant 
term. The resulting investment  equation  therefore  depends  on the first 
five moments  of the distribution  of mandated  investment.  This equation 
is estimated  by OLS, using the cross-sectional  moments  as explanatory 
variables. They also estimate the equation restricting  the coefficients 
on the higher moments to be zero, as implied by partial adjustment. 
The authors find that, when freely estimated, the parameter  values 
imply an average  adjustment  equation  that  is qualitatively  similar  to the 
average adjustment  equation that they had found nonparametrically 
from plant observations. The adjustment  function is clearly increasing 
for capital shortages  and close to zero for retirement  decisions. 
How much difference does this deviation from partial adjustment 
make to predictions  of aggregate  investment?  Is there sufficient varia- 
tion in the shape  and  location  of the underlying  distribution  of mandated 
investment  to lead to predictions  over the cycle or through  time that  are 
substantially  different from those made by the simpler model? An in- 
creasing adjustment  function matters  most when a large shock results 
in a distribution  of mandated  investment  with substantial  mass at high 
levels. The authors  find this effect in their  data. The authors  also illus- 
trate  the importance  of the adjustment  nonlinearity  by showing that  the 
marginal  response of the aggregate investment-to-capital  ratio varies 
widely over the sample. Using a decomposition  of the effect of a shock 
into a linear  portion  corresponding  to partial  adjustment  and  a nonlinear 
portion, they find that including  the nonlinear  adjustment  can be quite 
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when the nonlinear  equation  predicts  a decline in investment  20 percent 
greater  than the prediction  from a linear  equation. 
The authors conclude that the view of investment behavior that 
emerges from their examination of  microeconomic data is not only 
sensible, but is quite different  from that  commonly  assumed. Although 
there  is substantial  noise in their  plant-level  data, equipment  investment 
appears  consistent with the existence of nonconvexities in the cost of 
adjustment,  and there appears  to be substantial  variation  over time in 
the distribution  of  discrepancies between desired and actual capital 
stock. Taken together, these two facts imply that the response of ag- 
gregate investment  to common shocks, either to profitability  or to the 
cost of capital, is likely to depend  on the state of the economy and on 
the previous history of shocks. The authors  recognize their analysis 
pays too little attention  to dynamic  factors, including  the persistence  of 
shocks and an allowance for the time needed to build. Much remains 
to be done. But the paper  suggests the potentially  great value of using 
microeconomic information in explaining and predicting aggregate 
investment. 
S I N C E  T H E  L A T E  1970s, the U. S. banking industry  has been trans- 
formed  by changes in regulation, advances  in technology, and innova- 
tions in finance. Over one-third  of independent  banking  organizations 
have disappeared  during  this period, even as the assets of the banking 
system have been growing. Once the remaining  barriers  to interstate 
banking  are removed  after 1995, observers  expect the wave of mergers 
to continue  and  nationwide  banks  to emerge. How far  this consolidation 
will go,  how many small banks will survive, and how the historical 
activities of banks will change are all unresolved questions. In the 
second paper  of this volume, Allen Berger, Anil Kashyap,  and Joseph 
Scalise analyze developments  in banking  over the past fifteen  years  and 
address these and related questions about the future of the banking 
industry. 
The authors  first  review the key changes that have taken  place since 
the end of the 1970s. They divide regulatory  changes into five catego- 
ries: reduction in reserve requirements,  expansion of  bank powers, 
tightening of capital requirements,  deregulation  of deposit accounts, 
and relaxation  of restraints  on geographic  diversification.  The first  two 
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dustry. Reserve requirements  were reduced  three  times over the period 
studied  and  only a 10 percent  requirement  on transactions  balances  now 
remains.  Regulations  have been relaxed so that  today banks  can pursue 
a number  of potentially profitable  activities that were previously pro- 
hibited. For example, bank holding companies can have separately 
capitalized  subsidiaries  that  operate  mutual  funds and offer investment 
advice, provide brokerage  services, and underwrite  a range of securi- 
ties. Changes  in capital  requirements  have probably  reduced  bank  prof- 
its. These requirements,  which had been largely ad hoc through  the 
1970s, subsequently  underwent  two distinct  changes. Starting  in 1981, 
banks  were required  to hold capital  equal  to a flat percentage  of balance 
sheet assets, regardless  of their type. These rules provided  incentives 
both to reorganize  balance  sheet portfolios  and  to shift into off-balance 
sheet activities. The Basle Accord, which called for risk-based  capital 
standards  that applied to both on-  and off-balance sheet assets, ad- 
dressed these problems  starting  in 1990. The authors  show that banks, 
and especially large banks, held much more  capital  relative  to assets at 
the end of the period than they had at the end of the 1970s, indicating 
that the new capital standards  were probably  costly to them. 
The authors argue that the other two major regulatory  changes- 
deposit  account  deregulation  and  liberalization  of geographic  expansion 
rules-had  more ambiguous  effects on the industry.  Banks had histor- 
ically earned monopsony profits  because ceilings on the interest rates 
that they could pay meant  that they acquired  deposits at below-market 
rates. By the 1980s, market  innovations  such as money market  mutual 
funds had eroded this position by drawing deposit funds to nonbank 
institutions.  The deregulation  of deposits between 1981 and 1986 per- 
mitted  banks  to compete for funds, but  they now had  to pay competitive 
rates. Without  deregulation,  they would have held far less in deposits 
but  would have paid less for the deposits that  they did hold. The authors 
observe that the ability to diversify geographically  has increased  grad- 
ually over the past fifteen years and has favored  those banking  organi- 
zations that wanted  to expand  while hurting  those whose markets  were 
invaded. But until now there have still been major barriers  to bank 
consolidation across state lines. 
The Riegle-Neal Act of  1994 will remove all barriers  to interstate 
expansion  of banks, ushering  in an era of nationwide  banking.  To help 
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mensions  of the banking  transformation  that  has already  occurred.  First, 
assembling data from the quarterly  Reports of Condition and Income 
(Call Reports), they track the distribution  through  time of gross do- 
mestic assets by five asset size classes of banking organizations  (all 
expressed in real 1994 dollars): "small banks" with assets under  $100 
million; three size classes of "mid-sized banks" with assets ranging 
between $100 million and $100 billion; and "megabanks" with assets 
greater  than $100 billion. In their classification, all assets controlled 
directly or indirectly  by a bank  holding company  are aggregated  into a 
single "bank.  " 
The authors  document  a striking  amount  of consolidation  in the bank- 
ing industry  over the 1979-94 period.  Although  total  real  banking  assets 
rose by nearly one-quarter,  the number  of banking organizations  de- 
clined by more than one-third. Nearly all of this decline is explained 
by the disappearance  of over four thousand  small banks. The fraction 
of assets held by small banks  dropped  from 13.9 percent  to 7.0 percent, 
while the fraction  held by megabanks  doubled  from 9.4 percent  to 18.8 
percent. The authors attribute  this consolidation to the relaxation of 
geographic restrictions  on branching,  an easier process for approving 
mergers, and innovations  in information  processing and telecommuni- 
cations. They also identify other changes attributable  to technical and 
financial innovations. The value of derivative  positions in megabanks 
soared, and the share  of their noninterest  income, which includes fees 
from such activities, rose from  7 percent  to 21 percent  over this period. 
These figures  suggest that  asset size is an inadequate  measure  of banks' 
economic importance,  and  that  management  of market  risks  has become 
a crucial skill for large banks. Other  innovations  have transformed  the 
banking  business in different ways. The number  of ATMs has multi- 
plied eight times, and  the cost of processing  electronic  pay deposits has 
fallen to 15 percent  of its 1979 level. 
External  competition, from less-regulated  domestic financial insti- 
tutions, foreign institutions, and direct financing by borrowers, has 
reduced, by most measures, the market  share  of U.S. banks. Nonethe- 
less,  since overall financial activity has grown, the banking industry 
has not actually  declined but  rather  has grown  more  slowly than  it would 
have otherwise. Between 1979 and 1994, real gross assets of the in- 
dustry  grew by 23 percent  while real GDP rose by 41 percent.  The total 
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than  doubled, while the share  of this debt held by U.S. banks  fell from 
26 percent to  17 percent. Similarly, total non-credit market  debt of 
intermediaries  more than doubled, while the share held as deposits at 
U.S. banks  dropped  by one-third. 
Finally, the authors  show that the share  of U.S. banks in lending to 
nonfarm, nonfinancial  corporate  business fell from 20 percent to 15 
percent  over the 1979-94 period. The decline was more than  offset by 
increased  lending by foreign banks, mostly from offshore sources. But 
while foreign banks now have nearly  half of all bank  loans to nonfarm 
nonfinancial  corporations,  the authors  suggest that this share  exagger- 
ates their importance  as a source of financing  for U.S. business. Much 
of foreign banks' lending is to home country  clients with U.S. opera- 
tions, replacing a foreign rather  than a U.S.  bank loan. To a greater 
degree than domestic banks, they buy loans originated  by other large 
banks. And they are unlikely to lend to small business borrowers. 
The evolution of bank  lending, especially lending to small business 
borrowers  who typically have trouble  raising  funds cheaply from alter- 
native sources, are a special focus of the authors  because of their po- 
tential significance as nationwide banking develops. They show that 
real bank  commercial  and  industrial  (C&I)  loans declined  by 23 percent 
from  the end of 1989 to the end of 1992. Loans  dropped  proportionately 
more at small banks  than at megabanks,  indicating  that  the implemen- 
tation of risk-based  capital standards,  which impact the largest banks 
the most, were not responsible.  In the following two years, C&I  lending 
recovered  only a small part  of this decline, suggesting that it was part 
of a long-term  development. 
Building from the Federal  Reserve's quarterly  Survey of the Terms 
of Bank Lending  to Businesses (STBL), the authors  estimate  the distri- 
bution  of loans by bank  size and  borrower  size. They confirm  that  bank 
size and loan size are highly correlated. In 1994 megabanks  devoted 
only 2.5 percent  of their domestic C&I loans to small borrowers.  Con- 
versely, banks  with less than  $100 million in assets made 82 percent  of 
their loans to small borrowers  and made almost no loans to large bor- 
rowers. The authors  also estimate  the lending  patterns  for different  sizes 
of borrower  during 1989-94,  a period over which total real C&I loans 
declined by 19 percent. Their  estimates confirm  that the lending slow- 
down of 1989-92 disproportionately  affected small borrowers.  In the 
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so that  by the end of 1994 real loans were still down 35 percent  to small 
borrowers  and down 42 percent  to very small borrowers. 
Loans to medium-size borrowers  fell 14 percent  during  the lending 
slowdown years and were down only 2 percent  by 1994. Surprisingly, 
loans to large borrowers fit neither of  these patterns. They fell  26 
percent  during  the lending slowdown years and then declined further, 
so that by the end of  1994 they were 35 percent below 1989 levels. 
From  these patterns,  the authors  infer that  something  more  complicated 
than  an aggregate  reduction  in either  the supply of or demand  for loans 
has been at work. They discuss several  potential  explanations  and  attach 
particular  importance  to the idea that the reallocation of assets from 
small to large banks accounts for the decline in lending to small busi- 
ness, although  this consolidation  hypothesis  clearly cannot  explain the 
decline in lending to large borrowers. 
Armed  with these historical  patterns,  the authors  turn  to simulations  to 
address  two important  questions  about  the future  of the banking  industry: 
How much consolidation  is likely to occur once the Riegle-Neal Act 
permits  full nationwide  banking  over the next few years?  And what  will 
be the effect on lending, particularly  to small businesses?  They first  ex- 
plain  the within-state  distribution  of bank  assets  among  bank  size classes, 
using the changing  state restrictions  on branching  and merging  and also 
state  demographic  characteristics  as explanatory  variables.  They then  use 
these estimated  effects of regulatory  restrictions  to simulate  the effect of 
removing  restrictions  at the national  level. 
The authors  provide both a simulation that assumes no growth in 
total bank assets and a simulation  that assumes that each state's assets 
grow by 1.71 percent  a year, the national  average  over 1979-94. In the 
no-growth  case, substantial  consolidation  of the banking  industry  oc- 
curs quickly, although an important  number  of small banks remain. 
Within five years, the number  of banks falls by almost 4,000,  from 
7,926 to 4,106. The share  of domestic assets controlled  by megabanks 
more than doubles from 19 percent to 42 percent, while the share of 
small banks falls from 7 percent to 3.5  percent. There is very little 
additional  change after  the first  five years, and  the authors  note that  this 
quick adjustment  is consistent with the rapid response to regulatory 
change that  has been observed  at the state level. They also note that  the 
predicted distribution  of assets resembles the present distribution  in 
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In the simulation  that allows for total asset growth, the first five years 
show only slightly more consolidation, but thereafter  the differences 
widen. After twenty-five years only 1,939 banks remain and fifteen 
megabanks  control  47 percent  of all banking  assets. The authors  believe 
that these differences from the no-growth  simulations  primarily  reflect 
the historical  positive relation  between the amount  of bank assets in a 
state and the proportion  of assets in large banks. 
The authors  apply  their simulations  of industry  consolidation  to pro- 
ject the effect on credit flows. They assume that banks in each size 
category maintain  the ratios of loans by borrower  size to assets at their 
1994 levels. As assets are redistributed  among banks  of different  size, 
lending  to borrowers  of different  size changes. Over  the first  five years, 
lending to large borrowers  grows by 33 percent  in the simulation  with 
no growth in the economy, and by 50 percent  with growth. However, 
the authors  warn that these projections  take no account  of the decline 
in lending to large borrowers  that has been observed  over the past five 
years, a period  when the considerable  bank  consolidation  that  occurred 
might have led to predictions  of increase rather  than decline in such 
lending. They attribute  the recent decline to external  competition  and 
innovations  that were relatively more helpful to alternative  sources of 
finance, and they make no attempt  to project  such effects in the future. 
Loans to small borrowers  in the no growth projections  drop by 32 
percent  in five years, with little change thereafter.  The authors  observe 
that  these changes  are  actually  smaller  than  the decline in small  business 
lending that has occurred  over the past five years. In the projections 
with growth in bank assets the results are more complex. In the early 
years, the reduced share of assets in smaller banks is about offset by 
the growth in total assets and small business lending is about  the same 
as in the zero growth case. In later years, asset growth  dominates  and 
small business lending is somewhat higher. The authors  acknowledge 
that institutional  changes could produce  alternative  sources of finance 
for small business if these projections  based on past patterns  fall short 
of the economically efficient needs of small borrowers.  However, the 
authors  have no basis for anticipating  such change. And they reason 
that some small business lending, which typically has been conducted 
on the basis of relationships  between bankers  and borrowers,  may not 
have been efficient and may not be replaced  in the future. xx  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
NEARLY  A  YEAR after the event, observers  are still divided over the 
causes and handling  of the Mexican peso collapse in late 1994. Some 
believe it was brought  on by the bungling  of the new administration  in 
Mexico and argue no devaluation  was needed. Others  believe the cur- 
rency collapse was inevitable  because the government  had for too long 
maintained  the peso at a value that made it increasingly overvalued. 
Virtually  all observers  have been surprised  by the severity of the prob- 
lems that have emerged since the currency  started  to fall. In an earlier 
Brookings  paper (1:1994), Rudiger  Dornbusch  and Alejandro  Werner 
analyzed the then emerging problems in Mexico and anticipated  the 
peso devaluation. In the third paper of this volume, Dornbusch, Ilan 
Goldfajn, and Rodrigo 0.  Valdes revisit the peso crises together  with 
several other currency  collapses in an attempt  to identify common  fea- 
tures of those experiences. They also review why recent devaluations 
in Europe have been more successful. And they look at the present 
prospects  for Argentina  and Brazil. 
The authors' central premise is that overvaluation  resulting from 
exchange rate policies has been the central common factor in at least 
four  currency  crises during  the past fifteen  years:  Chile, 1978-82; Mex- 
ico,  1978-82;  Finland, 1988-92;  and Mexico,  1990-94.  While the 
details of policy and economic performance  vary in these four crises, 
they see broad  similarities  in the way the government's  attempt  to use 
a nominal exchange rate anchor to fight inflation led eventually to 
serious financial  and real economic difficulties. 
In Chile in 1979 the military  government,  having introduced  many 
promarket  reforms  but with prices still rising by over 30 percent  a year, 
fixed the peso-dollar exchange rate as a way to break an inflation- 
devaluation cycle.  The authors show that inflation slowed, but not 
enough to prevent  a substantial  real appreciation.  By August 1981, the 
real exchange rate  was 60 percent  higher  than  its 1970-80 average, and 
the current  account  deficit  was 14.5 percent  of GDP. The external  deficit 
had been easily financed because Chile's reforms, including budget 
surpluses,  and  the rapid  expansion  of the economy after  the deep reces- 
sion of 1975 made Chile newly attractive  to foreign lenders. Although 
inflation  was largely conquered  and wholesale prices actually  declined 
after  the summer  of 1981, the economy by then  had  fallen into recession 
and pressure  on the exchange rate mounted. With reserves dwindling, William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xxi 
the peso was devalued by 18 percent  in mid-1982, and by much more 
in the following years. 
The Mexican crisis of  1982 took place against a chaotic economic 
background.  The world was in recession following the OPEC II oil 
price increases  and high interest  rates, while the Mexican  economy had 
been growing  rapidly  under  the spur  of budget  deficits and  negative  real 
interest  rates. Although  the nominal  exchange rate  was fixed after  mid- 
1978, with only occasional adjustments,  the inflation rate was near 
20 percent in 1978 and 1979 and exceeded 25 percent in the follow- 
ing two years. By the end of 1981, the real exchange rate was 37 per- 
cent higher than it had been at its trough  in 1977. 
The exchange rate  was finally devalued  by 68 percent  in early 1982, 
but the authors  judge that action to have been too little, too late. The 
current  account deficit had worsened to $16 billion in 1981. With the 
currency convertible but overvalued and negative real interest rates, 
asset holders had been moving investments  abroad  and shifting to dol- 
lar deposits in the Mexican banking system. Inflation soared to near 
60 percent during 1982, while budget policy became sharply more 
expansionary  ahead  of the election. Capital  flight intensified  and Mex- 
ico was unable to meet its dollar interest obligations. The peso was 
devalued by almost 100 percent in late 1982, and by much more in 
subsequent  years. 
In the Finnish experience of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
authors  see another  example in which growing  overvaluation  eventually 
led to currency  crisis. Finland  liberalized  and deregulated  its economy 
during  the 1980s, opening its financial  markets  both domestically and 
internationally.  During  most of the decade it experienced  rapid  expan- 
sion, budget surpluses, and only moderate  inflation  as the authorities 
kept interest  rates high. However, in 1989, with inflation  having crept 
up to around  6 percent, but with demand  already  slowing, the central 
bank appreciated  the Finnish markka  as an anti-inflation  measure. Ac- 
cording to the authors,  this appreciation,  together  with the collapse of 
Russian trade and retrenchment  by the banking system which had 
overlent  in the years  following deregulation,  helped  start  a severe reces- 
sion in 1990. An official attempt  to peg the markka  in mid-1991 as a 
way to restore credibility and lower interest rates, soon had to be re- 
versed. The authors  observe that throughout  the crisis, credibility  was xxii  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
the focus of the exchange rate strategy:  the way to lower interest  rates 
was to emulate  Germany's  anti-inflation  stance. By contrast,  they argue 
that  such a strategy  could not achieve the crowding-in  that  was needed, 
and believe that a lower currency  value was needed and would have 
permitted  lower interest rates and rejuvenated  the economy. In fact, 
growth  did not resume  until real depreciation  helped expand  exports in 
the mid-1990s. 
The second Mexican crisis, which is still unresolved, followed a 
period in which Mexico moved forward  under  market-oriented  reform 
policies that were widely heralded  in the United States and other ad- 
vanced  countries,  and  that  culminated  in the North  American  Free  Trade 
Agreement.  International  lending  had  resumed  even before  the previous 
Mexican debt had been restructured  using Brady bonds and, by the 
1990s Mexico was attracting  large amounts of portfolio investment 
from  abroad.  Yet the authors  identify  three  unsatisfactory  developments 
of this period. Growth was slow, so that per capita income remained 
below its peak in 1981, before the first  Mexican  crisis. Inflation  contin- 
ued in the 20 to 30 percent range through 1991, although it slowed 
thereafter. And the peso again experienced a real appreciation.  Real 
appreciation  need not produce  overvaluation,  and indeed, the Mexican 
authorities  insisted that it had not. With reforms  and investment  boost- 
ing productivity, it could be argued that real appreciation  could be 
sustained. But the authors  reason  that  the widening  trade  imbalance,  at 
a time when the economy was not booming, showed that the currency 
had in fact become overvalued  and was vulnerable  to capital outflows. 
During 1994 a series of political events disturbed  markets  that were 
already  growing skeptical. In response, the government  sterilized the 
capital  flight  and  converted  peso debt  to dollar  debt, development  banks 
supplied  credit, and  the pressure  on the peso was resisted  until after  the 
election. When devaluation  came, its effects were made worse by the 
large amount  of debt incurred  in dollars  during  the time the government 
was resisting devaluation, and by the disillusionment of the finance 
community  that had continued investing in Mexico on the assurances 
that  there  would be no devaluation.  Had it not been for the intervention 
by the United States and the IMF, the authors  conclude that Mexico 
would again have defaulted  on its debts. 
The authors  contrast  the currency  collapses in Chile, Finland, and 
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nomic performance, with the devaluations that took place in Italy, 
Spain, and  the United Kingdom  in 1992. In these three  European  cases, 
disinflation  and possible eventual monetary  union was the official ob- 
jective behind pegging the exchange rate. The policy did reduce infla- 
tion, but at the cost of slow growth, high unemployment,  and high real 
interest  rates, which cast doubt on the resolve of policymakers  to stay 
the course. Speculators  tested that resolve and, one after another,  the 
vulnerable  currencies fell.  In each country, real currency  values and 
real interest  rates  declined, and  faster  growth  followed. Yet, surprising 
many observers, inflation increased only very modestly. The authors 
attribute  the vast difference between these outcomes and the economic 
disasters that accompanied  the currency  collapses in Chile, Finland, 
and Mexico mainly to the repercussions  on the respective financial 
systems. In the latter  countries, the large balance sheet impacts  of the 
currency  realignments  crippled their banking systems, while no such 
financial  fallout followed the European  episodes. 
The authors  summarize  three  conceptual  views that have framed  the 
discussion of real exchange rates: a monetarist  view and a classical 
view,  both of  which they reject for ignoring key aspects of  actual 
performance,  and a disequilibrium  view, which they see as encompass- 
ing the essentials of the currency  problem. In the monetarist  and clas- 
sical views, there is no reason for policymakers  to focus attention  on 
the nominal exchange rate. In the disequilibrium  view, because there 
is inertia  in wage and price inflation, a policy that constrains  the nom- 
inal exchange rate appreciates  the real exchange rate. The problem  is 
made worse when some reforms, such as trade  liberalization,  or other 
shocks, such as budget cutting, require  crowding-in and, to achieve 
this, real depreciation.  The relevant  policy choice is whether  to accom- 
plish desired changes in the real exchange rate by moving nominal 
exchange  rates  or through  deflation  or inflation.  Compared  with moving 
the nominal  exchange  rate, the authors  believe that  the other  routes  will 
generally have high real costs and take a long time. 
Many observers  of currency  crises have emphasized  the role of cur- 
rency speculators  and footloose capital as opposed to misguided poli- 
cies. The authors  stress that both are involved and that their roles are 
interrelated.  Changes  such as trade  liberalization  or budget  cutting  may 
be viewed favorably  in asset markets,  especially when they are part  of 
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ital inflows and  appreciate  a currency  when real depreciation  is needed. 
When the conditions for a crisis approach,  policymakers  are surprised 
by how the same markets  turn  on them, and markets  are surprised  by 
how little liquidity there is when everyone scrambles  for the exits to- 
gether. Moreover,  to the extent that  the credibility  of policies is tied to 
the existing exchange rate regime, when that regime is abandoned  the 
effects on credit availability  are greatly magnified. 
Finally, the authors  assess prospects  for Brazil and Argentina,  both 
countries  that  have experienced  strong  real appreciations.  They suggest 
that Brazil should devalue as part of  a comprehensive stabilization 
program,  while Argentina  should hold out and foster deflation.  In Bra- 
zil's case, currency  reform  brought  inflation  down from near hyperin- 
flation rates to annual rates of near 20 percent in early 1995. In the 
process, the currency appreciated  by  15 percent in real terms. The 
authors  see problems in this appreciation,  since pending reforms and 
budget cuts will restrain  demand, and interest  rates cannot be reduced 
sufficiently  to compensate  given the aggressively valued currency.  But 
they warn that devaluation  would be dangerous  without reforms that 
first  reduce  the very high degree of indexation  in wages and prices that 
currently  exists. In Argentina's  case, they argue  that  devaluation  is not 
an option because the economy is already  effectively on a dollar stan- 
dard, with all money creation fully backed by increases in foreign 
exchange reserves. If the peso goes,  Argentinians  will stay with the 
dollar, which is already the accepted means of payment. Thus they 
conclude that Argentina has no option but to work its way out of 
overvaluation  through  deflation  in the domestic economy. 
THE RELATION  between  the stock  market and the real economy  is a 
subject of continuing interest to economists and the financial  commu- 
nity. Changes in stock prices reflect, among other things, changes in 
expected future  earnings  and so should be a leading indicator  that pre- 
dicts real activity. Standard  theory  also suggests two important  avenues 
through which variations in stock prices should not just predict, but 
should actually influence real spending in the economy. First, since 
they affect the cost of capital  to firms  and  Tobin's q, stock prices should 
help determine investment spending. And second, since stocks are a 
large share of aggregate household wealth, stock prices should help 
determine  consumer  spending.  In the fourth  paper  of this volume, James William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xxv 
M. Poterba  and Andrew A. Samwick take a fresh, empirical look at 
how the stock market may affect the economy through this second 
avenue, investigating the stock market's  effect on consumer  spending 
and attempting  to distinguish this from its role simply as an indicator 
of future  economic activity. 
The authors  start  by putting  the 1995 stock market  rise in perspective. 
Using data through  midyear, they estimate that rising stock prices had 
already  added  roughly  $1 trillion  to the total  real  value  of U.S. corporate 
stock. The rise since then has about doubled this increase for the year 
as a whole, providing  a spectacular  increase  in the wealth  of stockhold- 
ers. The authors also present several commonly used indicators of 
whether average stock prices are high or low relative to historical 
norms. As of mid-  1995, most such indicators  showed stock prices at or 
near  historic  highs. These include the dividend  payout  rate  and, adding 
share  repurchases  to dividends, the total payout  rate;  Tobin's q, which 
compares  the market  value of shares  with the replacement  cost of firms' 
fixed capital; and the ratio of the market  value of shares to GDP. By 
contrast, the price-to-earnings  ratio was near  the middle of its historic 
range. 
Poterba  and  Samwick  note that  although  corporate  stock is ultimately 
owned by individuals, the form of ownership-whether  it is direct or 
through some form of intermediary-may  affect the impact of price 
fluctuations  on the owners' behavior. For example, stock held in the 
defined benefit retirement  plans of a state or local government  has no 
connection with the wealth of beneficiaries  and only an extremely in- 
direct  effect on the taxpayers  of the community  responsible  for paying 
the benefits. Even stocks in retirement  accounts  that are owned by the 
beneficiaries, such as IRAs, 401(k)s, or other tax-deferred  plans, may 
be viewed differently  by their owners than stocks held in other forms, 
in part because the tax-sheltered  plans have penalties for early with- 
drawal. 
To examine the significance  of changes in stock ownership  patterns, 
the authors  first examine the postwar  history of individual  stock own- 
ership. They adjust  the "household sector" ownership  category in the 
Flow of Funds accounts in several ways to make it more appropriate 
to explaining consumption: they remove nonprofit institutions, add 
stock held by bank personal  trusts, add stock held in defined  contribu- 
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companies, and add stock mutual funds owned by households. For 
1994, these adjustments  raise the share  of stocks owned by individuals 
from the 47.7 percent implied by the Flow of Funds  data for "house- 
holds" to 63.7  percent. Compared  with a decline of 42 percentage 
points  since 1952 in the Flow of Funds  household  category, the adjusted 
data show a decline of only 15 percentage  points in the share held by 
individuals  since 1952, and a stable share since 1982. 
Poterba  and Samwick  also summarize  evidence on the concentration 
of stock ownership  using data  from the Survey of Consumer  Finances. 
They find the proportion  of households with any stock holdings (ex- 
cluding trusts and variable annuities) has risen substantially, from 
19 percent in 1962 to 33 percent in 1992. This broader  participation 
has had little effect on the share of stock owned by the bottom 80 
percent of households, though there has been a noticeable change in 
the distribution  of ownership between the very top and the near top 
households. The distribution  of stockholdings  changed little between 
1962 and 1983. Then between 1983 and 1992, the share  of equity held 
by the top 0.5 percent  fell from 55 percent  to 37 percent, with nearly 
all this decline mirrored  by increases  in the share  held by the remainder 
of the top 20 percent. The holdings of the bottom 80 percent  increased 
only from 1 percent to 2 percent  of all equities. Not surprisingly,  the 
distribution  of ownership  is also concentrated  by age, though  less so in 
1992 than in 1983. Households headed by persons over 44 years old 
owned 78 percent  of stock in 1992 and 88 percent  of stock in 1983. 
Turning  to statistical analysis, the authors  first present time-series 
regressions for several broad consumption  categories that summarize 
the relation  between consumption  and  stock values. For  total consump- 
tion, a 10 percent  rise in stock prices is associated with a 0.64 percent 
rise in consumption  over the next four quarters.  The effect is greatest 
for durable goods, for which the associated consumption increase is 
2.9 percent,  and  weakest  for services, for which there  is no association. 
By these estimates, a 35 percent increase in stock prices, such as oc- 
curred  over the first eleven months of 1995 and which amounts  to an 
increase  of about  $2 trillion in wealth, predicts  a consumption  increase 
of about  $ 100 billion, or 5 percent  of the wealth  increase.  This response 
is very similar to estimates from other studies that assume a structural 
relation between consumption and wealth. However, as the authors 
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wealth effect lies behind  the regression  results, or whether  they simply 
reflect the stock market's  role as a leading indicator. 
To try to distinguish between these two possibilities, Poterba  and 
Samwick devise tests exploiting the fact that the distribution  of stock 
ownership  is so highly concentrated.  They first identify five broad  cat- 
egories of goods and services that are disproportionately  consumed  by 
high-income  households. Regressions show that  only for one of these, 
new cars, does the stock market  help explain spending  on that  category 
relative  to total consumer  spending.  And when they separate  luxury  and 
upper-luxury  cars from total new cars, they find that stock prices do 
not contribute  to explaining the ratio of their sales to total car sales, 
suggesting that in the equation  for new car sales, the stock market  was 
significant  as a leading indicator  rather  than as a causal variable. 
Turning  to PSID household survey data, Poterba  and Samwick find 
weak support for a causal connection running from stock values to 
consumption:  separating  households into three categories according  to 
the amount  of stock they hold, and using proxies for total consumption 
by household, they find the correlation  between consumption  growth 
and stock market  returns  is higher  the more stock a household  owns. 
The authors  next examine the effects of changing stock ownership 
patterns. If stock prices are only a leading indicator, then changing 
ownership patterns  should not matter, while if they are causing con- 
sumption  through  wealth  effects, then changing  patterns  should  matter. 
They compare  the explanatory  power for consumption  of stock prices 
alone with the explanatory  power  of a variable  that  interacts  stock prices 
with the share of  stock that is owned by households. Although the 
interactive  term performs  slightly better, the collinearity of the alter- 
native explanatory  variables  is so high that the hypothesis  of no effect 
from the share variable  cannot be rejected. 
Some empirical  studies suggest that changes in stock prices that are 
associated with changes in earnings  or dividends are more likely to be 
permanent  than are changes without  this association. Informed  by this 
evidence, the authors  examine whether  dividends  or earnings  add  to the 
predictive power of stock prices for consumption. But in a series of 
equations  explaining  total consumption  and  its major  components,  they 
find almost no evidence that  earnings  or dividends  have such an effect. 
Thus stock price increases  appear  to have similar  relations  to consump- 
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On the basis of all their tests, Poterba  and Samwick conclude that 
there is only slight evidence of a wealth effect through  which stock 
prices affect consumption, a finding that challenges a widely used, 
traditional  model of consumption. However, they note that consump- 
tion may respond  so gradually  to stock market  wealth that  the effect is 
missed by their tests. Or, since stock prices seem to predict future 
activity, they may affect consumption  through  channels such as con- 
sumer confidence rather  than wealth, an effect that would not be de- 
tected by many of the authors'  tests. 
THE  GROWTH  of  government has been one of  the most dramatic 
changes in the structure  of industrialized  countries in the post-World 
War II period. In twenty-four  OECD countries, government  expendi- 
tures as a ratio to GDP rose from less than 35 percent in 1970 to a 
plateau of over 45 percent by 1982. From the beginning there have 
been critics as well as supporters  of this growth, and in recent years a 
strong political movement has emerged arguing  that much of govern- 
ment activity is unproductive. In the fifth paper of this issue, Joel 
Slemrod critically reviews the evidence that has been put forth on the 
effects of government  on economic activity. One major difficulty in 
assessing the costs and  benefits  of government  is that  many  of the goals 
of government  intervention  are not directly related to usual measures 
of economic activity. The distribution  of income, provision  of minimum 
levels of shelter and medical care, condition of the environment,  and 
insurance  against social risks may all affect individual  or societal wel- 
fare but will affect measured  output  indirectly, if at all. Since they are 
not valued in markets, assessing the benefits of pursuing  these goals 
inevitably involves value judgments. Slemrod  avoids this difficulty  by 
limiting his review to the effects of government  on conventional  mea- 
sures of economic prosperity  and growth. He reasons that if there is 
agreement about these net costs or benefits, they can be stacked up 
against the more subjective benefits of government  involvement, thus 
narrowing  the debate. Unfortunately,  however, even this more limited 
objective is difficult to achieve; economists are far from a consensus 
about  the effect of government  on measured  economic activity. 
Slemrod distinguishes between two broad  approaches  to estimating 
the economic effects of government, "top-down" and "bottom-up." 
The top-down approach  attempts  to infer the net costs of government William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xxix 
from the relationship  between aggregate measures  of taxes or expen- 
ditures  and  the level or rate  of growth  of GDP. The bottom-up  approach 
estimates net costs program  by program  and tax by tax. Slemrod be- 
lieves that both approaches  are fraught  with difficulty and that persua- 
sive evidence is hard  to find. Simple correlations  between the extent of 
government  and  the level of GDP per  capita  illustrate  the problem.  Both 
for a given country over time and across countries, such correlations 
are frequently  positive. For example, there is a strong  positive associ- 
ation between the size of government  and  output  over the period 1929- 
82, not only for the United States, but throughout  the developed  world. 
The unprecedented  growth of government  has occurred  over the same 
period as the unprecedented  growth of output. However, that this re- 
lationship is causal is implausible  even to many of those who believe 
the overall effects of government  on welfare are positive; such individ- 
uals would not be surprised  to find a negative effect of government  on 
measured  output, since a large fraction of the benefits of government 
are not captured  in measured  output  and most costs are. Across coun- 
tries, the relationship  between prosperity  and the extent of government 
is less clear. No obvious correlation  exists for either  tax or expenditure 
ratios in  1990, and the positive relationship for a larger sample of 
countries  apparently  reflects  the difference  between  the high-tax  OECD 
countries  and  the rest of the world. Slemrod  is not aware  of any serious 
academic study that purports to demonstrate a significant negative 
causal relationship  between the extent of government  and the level of 
prosperity. 
Slemrod believes that a fundamental  difficulty comes from simul- 
taneity in the determination  of  GDP and G,  measuring the size of 
government.  While a large G, if unproductive,  may decrease  the level 
of measured  output that can be expected from an economy, it is also 
true that the demand  for G depends  on the level of output. In order  to 
clarify  the resulting  identification  problem,  and  the resulting  estimation 
bias, Slemrod analyses a simple model in which G affects measured 
output, Y, and in which G itself is determined  by an optimizing gov- 
ernment. In any empirical application, each of these relationships  is 
subject to error. Variations in costs across countries or time can be 
expected to bias upward  single equation  estimates  of the effect of G on 
Y. For example, consider two countries with different but constant 
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Ceteris paribus, the country  with the higher costs will have the lower 
G, but  also the lower Y. A cross-country  regression  will show a spurious 
positive relation  between G and Y. Ideally the investigator  could iden- 
tify the cost curve by finding variables that influence the benefits of 
government  activity but do not enter in the cost curve; but Slemrod 
doubts that this can be done in practice. 
With this framework  as a backdrop,  Slemrod gives a broad  review 
of the vast empirical literature  investigating the relationship  between 
the extent of  government and the level of prosperity. Remarkably, 
except for a few studies, the literature  makes hardly  any reference  to 
the simultaneity  problem. However, no one appears  to have had the 
temerity  to simply regress  Y  against  G, perhaps  because  it takes  courage 
to assert that no important  unmeasured  influences  on Y would be cor- 
related with G.  In contrast, Slemrod notes that scores of empirical 
studies by economists, political scientists, and sociologists try to ex- 
plain G, or the growth  of G, and some of these include Y  as a regressor. 
The sample of studies that he reviews offers a wide range of possible 
explanations  of the growth of G, ranging  from the simple explanation 
of a high income elasticity to explanations  which give no direct causal 
connection between high Y and high G, taking both to reflect other 
factors, such as a high level of literacy or political stability. While the 
studies propose a wide variety of  possible reasons for the positive 
correlation  between Y and G, none explicitly allow for G affecting Y. 
In recent years there has been an explosion of top-down, cross- 
country  studies which reverse  the question, asking about  the impact  of 
government  taxation and expenditure  on output. Slemrod's extensive 
review shows a striking  a difference  of perspective  between  these stud- 
ies and the earlier  studies of the determinants  of G. First, in the recent 
studies G is always on the right-hand  side of the equation, with little or 
no attention  given to how it is determined.  Second, G is related  not to 
the level but to the rate of growth of output. Slemrod attributes  the 
burst of research activity and its emphasis on growth to two events. 
First, the publication  by Robert  Summers  and Alan Heston of compa- 
rable data for a large number  of countries provides a convenient and 
rich source  of information  for cross-country  and  panel studies. Second, 
the emergence of a new theory in which the rate of output  growth  can 
be permanently  affected by the rate of saving or the level of taxes or 
government  expenditures. In the standard  neoclassical model, except William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xxxi 
for a period  of transition,  these variables  affect only the level of output, 
not its long-run growth rate. The need to test the new theory and 
compare  its empirical  performance  with that of the neoclassical model 
has provided  a strong  stimulus  to empirical  work. Not only do the new 
theories  provide  a rationalization  for estimating  growth  equations,  they 
also typically suggest that  effects of taxes and  expenditures  can be quite 
large. 
Slemrod  begins his review of this new empirical  literature  by plotting 
the relationship  between growth rates and both tax and expenditure 
ratios, for all countries, and for the OECD countries  only. These plots 
reveal no striking relationships, suggesting to Slemrod that it will be 
difficult for empirical work to provide any clear verdict. Although a 
few authors  have found that taxes depress growth, a large number  of 
other  studies show that  such associations  are  by no means  robust.  Slem- 
rod also finds that, with the exception of work by Robert  Barro, these 
studies, too, are flawed by lack of attention  to simultaneity. He con- 
cludes that the existing cross-country  literature  provides  no persuasive 
evidence for either a positive or a negative impact of government  on 
the level or growth rate of income. 
Although  Slemrod  suggests that much  of the ambiguity  in empirical 
studies arises because  of the fundamental  problems  of identification,  he 
also discusses other conceptual  and practical  problems  confronting  re- 
search in this area. Little can be done about some of these problems, 
such as the limited and poor quality of data, or the fact that some 
purported  mechanisms  for an effect from government  act by changing 
social norms, attitudes, ethics, and habits in the very long run and are 
not susceptible to measurement. However, Slemrod identifies some 
empirical and conceptual issues that could benefit from greater  atten- 
tion. For example, arbitrary  conventions  of government  budgeting  can 
make economically equivalent programs  appear  to represent  different 
levels of government  involvement in different  countries. Both France 
and the United States have policies that provide net fiscal benefits to 
families with more  children.  In France,  these appear  as direct  payments 
to families, and are recorded  as an expenditure;  in the United States, 
they primarily  take the form of tax exemptions for each dependent. 
Even if the policies provided  equivalent support, the budgeting rules 
would portray  France  as having higher taxes and expenditures. 
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more difficult to correct. Some government  activities have substantial 
measured  costs, but also have benefits that do not appear  in conven- 
tionally measured  output. Expenditures  on the environment  and social 
insurance  programs  are  examples  where  the unmeasured  benefits  reflect 
an explicit policy goal. The increase in leisure resulting  from the dis- 
incentive effects of taxes on labor  is an example where  the unmeasured 
benefits  (or costs) are a byproduct  of a government  activity undertaken 
for another  reason. Another  category  of measurement  problems  results 
when the government  intervention  is measured  badly, if at all, but the 
effects of the intervention  are likely to show up in measured  output. 
Slemrod  lists government  regulatory  and  antitrust  polices, trade  restric- 
tions, and the enforcement  of property  rights as examples. If errors  in 
measuring output show up as random noise, errors in measuring G 
would bias the coefficient of G toward  zero. But Slemrod notes that a 
positive correlation between measured and unmeasured  G could ac- 
tually bias the estimates of the cost of government  upward.  He makes 
special note of  the research by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner 
(BPEA, 1:1995) and  by David Cameron  suggesting  that  a government's 
policies toward  openness to the world economy are potentially  impor- 
tant. Openness can have consequences far beyond its direct effect on 
the volume of measured  trade  by affecting the competitiveness  of mar- 
kets, the ability to raise taxes, and the need for government  stabiliza- 
tion. To the extent that openness affects the costs and benefits  of gov- 
ernment  policy, it will be a determinant  of G, and another  example of 
why it is critical to worry about identification. 
All the studies discussed thus far measure  the impact  of government 
taxes by the share  or per capita level of revenue  or expenditures.  How- 
ever, the link between revenue  collected and aggregate  disincentives  is 
far from direct. Slemrod therefore  turns to the issues involved in ob- 
taining a better estimate of disincentives. One issue is the difference 
between the average  and marginal  tax rates. In idealized linear income 
tax systems, this difference could be captured  by supplementing  the 
average tax ratio with a measure of progressivity. The task becomes 
more complicated  when combining  taxes and transfers,  since transfers 
are  typically means-tested  and  often have a nonlinear  structure.  Another 
complication  arises  when, as in some countries,  the benefits  of transfers 
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force participation.  This is especially true in countries like Sweden 
where not only does eligibility for many programs  require  labor force 
participation  but, in some cases, the benefits  are an intrinsic  part  of the 
job, tying them to taxes at the individual  decisionmaking  level. In such 
systems, the disincentive effects of taxes on participation  are substan- 
tially muted, although  the system also generates a strong incentive to 
participate  at the minimal  level of hours  needed for eligibility. Even in 
the United States, these effects may be important.  Social security  ben- 
efits are tied to designated  payroll taxes, albeit in a complicated  way. 
For example, Martin  Feldstein and Andrew Samwick have calculated 
that although  the statutory  marginal  payroll  tax on employees was 11.2 
percent  in 1990, the actual  effective marginal  tax rate, net of benefits, 
varies from that level to as low as -  6 percent. 
The preceding complications suggest the need to take into account 
the fine structure  of tax and expenditure  programs.  A different  kind of 
problem comes from the fact that marginal statutory rates, even if 
precisely calculated, do not appropriately  capture  incentive effects. As 
is obvious even to laymen, effective tax rates may be quite different 
than statutory  rates. Slemrod gives several examples of  "avoidance 
technology." For long periods, incorporating  a business firm and re- 
taining earnings was an effective way to cap the effective tax rate. 
Because of the deferral  of realizations  and  the revision  of basis at death, 
the effective rate  on capital  gains in the United States is only a fraction 
of the statutory  rate. Less apparent  to the layman is the lesson of tax 
theory that the magnitude  of disincentive effects depends not only on 
the tax rate, but also on the degree of substitutability  or complementar- 
ity between the taxed items and untaxed  leisure. 
An even more subtle point is that almost all economic models of the 
response  to taxation  focus on the behavior  of atomistic  agents when, in 
fact, nonatomistic  institutions  exist and may adapt  to government  ac- 
tivity. Slemrod  notes that  some authors  have suggested  that  differences 
in tax levels and tax structures  among OECD countries  reflect differ- 
ences in the extent to which labor  market  institutions  are corporatist  or 
centralized. In these circumstances,  taxes on labor  may be less distor- 
tionary  than when labor supply is determined  individually  because the 
central decisionmakers  recognize the linkage between taxes paid and 
benefits received. This is analogous to tying benefits to costs at the xxxiv  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
individual  level. But Slemrod notes that although  the distortive  effect 
of taxes may be less in countries  with corporatist  labor market  institu- 
tions, these same systems may have offsetting efficiency costs. 
The existence of nongovernmental  institutions  and associations  cre- 
ates another  complication, both for assessing the incentive effects of 
the tax and expenditure  system within a country  and for making  cross- 
country comparisons. Many nongovernmental  organizations  that pro- 
vide goods and services charge income-tested  or wealth-tested  prices. 
According to Feldstein, for example, need-based college scholarship 
rules can impose an additional marginal  tax rate of between 22 and 
47 percent  on the incremental  labor  earnings  of students'  parents  during 
the years of attendance.  A comparison  of the U.S. tax system with that 
of a country  where higher  education  receives greater  public support  by 
means  of a graduated  income tax would overstate  the relative  disincen- 
tive effects of the latter  system. Slemrod  cites other differences in the 
division of responsibilities  between the private  and public sectors and 
suggests that the explicit tax rates of the welfare state have, to some 
degree, replaced  the implicit  tax rates  and  disincentives  of the extended 
family and private  institutions  in countries  without social welfare. 
Slemrod  concludes  that  our  current  understanding  of the link  between 
real government  activity and private  behavior  is far from satisfactory. 
But he is optimistic about improving  this situation, seeing a large and 
"intellectually challenging research  agenda that would refine our un- 
derstanding  of the link between government  involvement, prosperity, 
and growth." 